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Abstract:
The interwar period in Europe was characterised by a multi-faceted movement in favour of
European integration. After the slaughter of the First World War, many intellectuals, writers,
industrialists and politicians brought the idea of European unity to the fore and engaged in
various actions, from setting up organisations to lobbying governments, to promote the
unification of Europe. Much research has been carried out on the leading figures of these pro-
European activities but amongst the wealth of this period other actors have tended to be
forgotten. Such is the case with the French writer Jules Romains, who not only coined
“Europeanism”, the word that would define the whole movement in favour of Europe, but
who also actively participated in promoting a united Europe. This article seeks to introduce
and discuss Romains’ ideas on Europe. It will demonstrate that his vision was very coherent
within the framework of his Unanimist philosophy but was undermined by serious
ambiguities. It will also demonstrate that his ideas are of great interest for what they reveal
about the interwar period in France and Europe, what they bring to the genealogy of the
European project, as set up after the Second World War, and for the ambiguities at the core of
his concept of Europe, which are still very much at the heart of many of today’s debates
about the European Union.
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Introduction
The period between the two World Wars in Europe witnessed a multi-faceted movement in
favour of European unity, with a flurry of organisations, activities, and writings (Chabot
2005; Den Boer et al. 1995; Duchenne 2008; Pagden 2002). The idea of uniting Europe was
debated in previous centuries, from St Pierre’s perpetual peace (1713) to Kant’s project for a
universal peace (1795) or Victor Hugo’s call for the United States of Europe (1819).
However, whilst in the past such calls were those of a few intellectuals, in contrast, the years
after the First World War were characterised by concerted efforts from a much wider range of
individuals and organisations to promote the idea of a united Europe, from intellectuals to
politicians and industrialists (Dethurens 2002; Saint-Gille 2003; Spiering & Wintle 2002).
This groundswell in favour of a United Europe culminated in the French Foreign Minister
Aristide Briand’s proposal to create ‘a kind of federal link’ presented at the League of
Nations in 1929, followed by his famous memorandum on the organisation of a federal union
in 1930 (Heater 1992, 133-146). The rise of Nazism in the Thirties led to a progressive loss
of impetus, as Europe edged towards war (Chabot 2005, 204-206).
Many books and articles have been written on these pro-European activities in the interwar
period (Chabot 2005; Duchenne 2008; Heater 1992; Muet 1997; Saint-Gille 2003; Stirk
1989). They have tended to focus on leading political figures, such as Briand, leading
organisers and organisations, in particular Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Pan-Europa
or leading intellectuals such as Valéry. With such a rich period, it is relatively easy to forget
individuals who contributed to promoting a United Europe, but who are now consigned to
brief mentions in books on this period. Such is the case with the man who coined
‘Europeanism’, the word that would define the interwar movement in favour of European
unity, as early as 1916. This man was the French writer Jules Romains (1875-1972). After the
3war he became renowned worldwide both as one of the best-selling authors in interwar
France and as an intellectual activist, deeply involved in the debates of the day through his
participation in various organisations (Pan-Europa, international PEN club, International
Institute of Intellectual Cooperation), and numerous conferences. His fame steadily waned
after the Second World War and his reflections on Europe nowadays are, to a large extent,
only briefly cited in books and articles on this period.
Yet, Jules Romains not only sang Europe’s praises in his poem Europe and advocated a
United Europe in Pour que l’Europe soit, both written in 1916, at a time when war hysteria
was raging (Den Boer et al. 1995, 64) and only a handful of intellectuals spoke against the
war (Antoine 2002), but from then on he would become a tireless supporter of the European
idea throughout his fictional and non-fictional work, his articles for the newspaper La
dépêche de Toulouse in the Thirties, his involvement in the debates of the time, and his
political activism which led him to seek to influence leading political figures in France and
Europe, as narrated in his book Les sept mystères du destin de l’Europe (1940), making him
an extremely committed European activist.
This article seeks to re-examine Romains’ thoughts on Europe in order to contribute to the
growing body of work on the forefathers of European integration. It argues that his vision for
Europe, fuelled by his Unanimist philosophy and extremely coherent from this point of view,
was undermined by serious ambiguities and a lack of precision that his call for good will
could not fully conceal. It further argues that his reflections, viewed through three lenses, are
of great interest: historically for what they reveal about the inter-war period in France and
Europe; politically for the genealogy of the current European integration; ideologically for
highlighting the difficulties surrounding the very concept of ‘Europe’ still present in many of
today’s debates. The article will address Romains’ idea of Europe during the interwar period,
focusing on what Europe is, why Europe should be united and, finally, how this should occur.
4The European illumination
As a young man, Romains felt deeply alienated from society and his early writings revealed a
pessimistic and misanthropic vision of history: ‘Les nations courent après un rêve de
Bonheur; dès qu’elles croient l’atteindre elles s’écroulent. C’est un signe des temps et un
symptôme funeste pour la France’ (Guyon, 1981, 87). This led him to sympathise with
nationalist ideas (‘Le nationalisme, cet admirable sursaut de l’âme française’ (Guyon 1981,
87)), as put forward at the time in France by Paul Déroulède and his League for the French
Nation. He radically departed from this early stance in 1903 when he was struck by the
sudden overwhelming feeling of belonging to humanity, in the famous illumination he
experienced in Rue d’Amsterdam, when he felt that the crowd did not consist of isolated
individuals but had its own existence and its own soul, as explained in his poem La vie
unanime: ‘Les hommes / ressemblent aux idées qui longent un esprit./ D’eux à moi rien ne
cesse d’être intérieur;/ rien ne m’est étranger de leur joue à ma joue; et l’espace nous lie en
pensant avec nous’ (Romains 1908, 47). A new philosophy, Unanimism, was born, based on
the idea that individuals were not ‘islands of solitude’ (Romains 1933c, 230) but that they
could fuse with any given group, which he called a Unanime (230). Each Unanime is
integrated with one another in ever wider circles, from a group of friends to the reunion of
everybody in a universal catholicity:
Alors soudain sans le savoir, sans qu’on y pense, / on sera sûr qu’un homme est tué quelque part / […]
et je devinerai qu’un être me réclame / pour que j’aspire sa conscience de loin / […] chaque homme
percevra que sa chair, à lui, meurt / que le sang coule de la bête collective / c’est le dernier espoir, le
meilleur, je le garde/ […] il faudra bien qu’un jour on soit l’humanité (Romains 1908, 123-127).
Unanimism not only revolutionised Romains’ outlook on life and society (Cuisenier 1969;
Rony 1993) but is key to understanding his attitude towards Europe. Indeed, a journey
5through Europe in 1911-1912 led him to experience it as a Unanime, with its own soul. When
reminiscing about this discovery of Europe, Romains explained (1950, 430):
J’eus, d’un bout à l’autre, dans ce compartiment solitaire un compagnon: le sentiment d’Europe. Il ne
faisait pas de phrases. Il ne prenait même pas la peine de me montrer le paysage qui défilait: il se
contentait d’être là.
From then on, Europe’s beauty was constantly praised (Europe, for example, is a declaration
of love for all the towns, mountains, rivers he had seen whilst travelling) and its woes during
the war lamented with stark and angry images (‘Europe! Europe! Je crie / ne te laisse pas
mourir / cramponne-toi, crispe toi/ reprends ta vie dans un spasme / écrase le dieu terrible’
(1916, 68)). Europe in the immediate aftermath of war is depicted as being disfigured in
L’Ode génoise, a time of misery and anger, with reminders of what it used to be (‘[Gêne] sait
me faire croire à des époques heureuses / où le royaume de l’homme était un rubis creusé’
(1925, 184).) In the Thirties, with the imminence of ever greater perils, his anxiety led him to
seek every avenue possible to stop Europe falling into a new disaster (1935a, 185-197; 1940).
Romains’ Europe was not an intellectual construction but was intimately felt as a Unanime.
However, what does Romains understand exactly by ‘Europe’?
What is Europe? Unity in diversity.
Romains’ answer rested on a dialectic between national diversity and Europe’s fundamental
unity. Despite their differences, all the Europeans countries were a fragment of a nation
(Romains 1933a, 23) which united them and explained their evolution.
Diversity is apparent in Romains’ strong belief in the existence of national types. Europe’s
various nations are described as races and their differences are stressed with a technique that
was prevalent in the interwar period (Jennings 1999, 214): folk psychology, the idea that
6peoples have their own psychology, which defines them and makes them unique. The most
striking example in Romains is his study of the Germans, just like many French intellectuals
of his time, following in particular Jacques Rivière and his hugely influential book
L’Allemand (1918). Throughout his writings, Romains developed a German ethnotype based
on two characteristics: irrationality, as illustrated by German romanticism, which he claimed
went the furthest away from reason (1933a, 37) and a love for order (Romains 1946, 262).
The contradiction between the two leads to unpredictability and untrustworthiness (‘Elle se
moque des contrats, des signatures […] quand il s’agit d’un ennemi, le contrat est vain. […]
On ruse, on triche. […] C’est ce que nous appelons, nous, la mauvaise foi allemande’
(Romains 1934, 53).) These characteristics made the Germans unique and radically different
from any other nations, such as France’s majestic elegance, Britain’s poetry and wisdom or
Spain’s perpetual tensions (Romains 1946, 261).
For many authors, such as Henri Massis, stressing national differences was meant to reinforce
nationalism and this was precisely what Romains himself thought in his early years.
However, following his Unanimist illumination he set out to demonstrate that European
countries had their own individual characteristics but were all part of the same bigger whole,
i.e. Europe:
Tout homme qui a voyagé en Europe, […], n’a qu’à s’interroger […] n’a-t-il pas senti que les divers
pays qui la composent ne sont désormais que des provinces, chacune riche et fière, sans doute, de ses
traditions et désireuses à bon droit d’en garder la parade, mais des provinces néanmoins, c’est-à-dire
des fragments d’une patrie? (Romains1933a, 23)
All these intrinsically different countries shared common characteristics which not only
united them as European but also explained their evolution. First of all, their geographical
layout underlined Europe’s unity:
7Qu’il s’agisse de la disposition des principales chaines de montagnes, de la distribution des bassins
fluviaux ou du système des voies ferrées et des voies navigables artificielles l'Europe forme dès
maintenant une société continue assise solidement sur un ensemble géographique (Romains 1933a, 22-
23).
The ‘joints’ of Europe, rivers such as the Rhine or the various mountain passes were
particularly stressed (Romains 1916, 33), as they united Europe geographically.
The second and main characteristic was a common civilisation, superior to any other found
across the world. Indeed, all Europeans belonged to :
Une civilisation qui n’était plus, de toute évidence, une civilisation parmi d’autres, qui était le résultat
suprême et convergent des efforts de l’esprit humain, la plus haute tentative de l’espèce pour s’éloigner
de la condition primitive (Romains1946, 250-51).
He set out to show that this common civilisation derived from being blessed with the twin
spirits which, borrowing from Nietzche, he called Apollo and Prometheus: ‘C’est ainsi qu’il y
avait deux variétés, deux crus de l’Esprit qui depuis des siècles poussaient là et nulle part
ailleurs: l’esprit appolinien et l’esprit prométhéen’ (Romains 1946, 243). The Apollonian
mind referred to arts and spiritual activities and, for him, it reached its apex amongst
Europeans: ‘chez elle seule, les produits supérieurs de l’esprit avaient atteint ou dépassé leur
constitution adulte’ (245). Thus, he believed that no-one had ever surpassed the Europeans in
terms of literature, painting, music, or philosophy (245-47). Not only were Europeans blessed
with an Apollonian mind but they combined it with the Promethean material and practical
mind, which led to unparalleled technical and economic development, ensuring domination
over all other peoples (248).
This commonality of mind amongst all Europeans could be found in their similar economic,
social and political development, their common critical attitudes towards religion and the
State, as demonstrated by the power of religion being curtailed and by the various revolutions
8in Europe to overthrow despots, as well as in their attitudes towards society itself, with the
same quest for justice, as illustrated by the development of Socialism (Romains 1946, 255).
He acknowledged that the pace and timing might have been different from country to country
but he posited that all of them went through these developments, through Europe’s ‘pact’
with these two minds (257).
Finally, Europe’s fundamental unity could be seen from the viewpoint of the colonised world,
for which Europe was one. For Romains, the benefits brought to the colonised were the same
everywhere, irrespective of which European country was the coloniser. Europeans led other
peoples and created a new order by introducing civilisation (Romains 1946, 250-251).
All in all, Romains considered that both in terms of geography and civilisation as well as in
the eyes of the colonised, Europe, despite its diversity, was one. This explains why, in his
poem Europe, he presented his body as being attached to France but his mind to Europe
(1916, 10). This also explains why he could consider the First World War as a civil war:
Je soutiens que la guerre européenne de maintenant a plus d’un point commun avec la guerre de
sécession des Etats-Unis. L’une et l’autre de ces guerres présentent le caractère essentiel d’être un
conflit armé à l’intérieur d’une civilisation homogène. […] Les adversaires se haïssent et se cherchent
avec cette passion excessive qui n’éclate qu’entre proches parents. Une guerre proprement dite, entre
deux peuples vraiment étrangers l’un à l’autre, a quelque chose de plus froid, de plus impersonnel
(1933a, 19).
The identity of Romains’ Europe can be defined as essentialist, in a Fichtean-like vision of a
European nation based on a common culture, geography and history (Llobera 2003, 189).
Whereas, using Renan’s subjective definition of a nation based on a shared destiny, it could
be shown that shared experiences gradually created a European consciousness, Romains, on
9the contrary, seemed to suggest that it was precisely because they were Europeans that all
European nations shared the same experiences and that national identities derived from the
same general European matrix. It can be argued, to use Edgar Morin’s concepts of culture
and civilisation (1990), that Romains ascribed culture, in other words the individual
characteristics of a society, to nations and civilisation, what can be transmitted, to Europe.
However, it can also be argued that Romains took this hypothesis further and defined Europe
as a Unanime with its own soul, by suggesting that European civilisation derived from a
common mind and then spawned national cultures. This essentialist and Unanimist vision,
however, is extremely problematic, both in the many unanswered questions it creates and its
lack of conceptual clarity.
The ambiguities of Europe
The first difficulty in Romains’ thinking is the definition of a geographical entity called
Europe. During the interwar period, various attempts were made to define Europe’s borders,
which were not successful, as too many interpretations were given. For some, such as
Coudenhove-Kallergi (1923), Europe had to exclude Britain, because of its empire, as well as
Russia and Turkey because they were not wholly on the European continent, which was
opposed by many others, such as Woytinski (1927) or Sforza (1929). Others such as
Heerfordt (Du Réau, 2008, 83) or Hauser (1926) included every nation defining itself as
European or with a European heritage. The same inability to define European borders can be
seen in Romains’ writings. First, where Europe started was not clear. He mentioned that
Europe was attached to Asia:
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L’Europe touchait à l’Asie, s’appuyait et se confondait à l’Asie par la région épaisse, étalée,
relativement peu différenciée et peu sensible de sa structure. Et c’est de l’autre côté qu’elle poussait les
prolongements […] les péninsules, les paquets serrés de peuples, les grappes de villes. (1946, 235)
However, this definition is extremely vague and begs the question as to where Asia ends and
where Europe begins, as well as what happens with countries that might straddle both. At one
point he mentioned that Europe extended from the Urals to Gibraltar, from Thrace to the
Hebrides (1946, 289), however, in other writings, he included Russia in Europe (1946, 280),
which defies this definition of Europe starting from the Urals. Second, where Europe ended
was not clear either, as he talked about the New World in America as the New Europe, ‘son
prologement au-delà des mers’ (1946, 250), which seemed to suggest that Europe was where
Europeans were and yet in Pour que l’Europe soit he told Americans that he was turning to
them because they did not belong to Europe. A precise definition of Europe’s borders cannot
be found and his geography appears intuitive, something that, as a traveller, he could feel, as
illustrated by his numerous amorous description of Europe’s morphology, but upon close
inspection it unravels.
The second difficulty in Romains’ arguments is his essentialist definition of European
civilisation. The idea of such civilisation was not unique to Romains and can be traced back
to the XVIIIth century (Den Boer et al. 1995, 59), with recurring themes based on the
Christian, Greek and Roman heritage, liberty and liberal political principles (Pagden 2002;
Den Boer et al. 1995). All interwar intellectuals agreed that the European mindset was the
product of a common history (Muet 1996, 48) and they shared many similar references, such
as critical mind, Greek political concepts, universalism, reason or science (Spiering & Wintle
2002, 23-27). However, the content of this civilisation varied, from Valéry’s three matrices
that were Greece, Rome, and Christendom (1919) to Hauser’s stress on the Reformation
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(1926), from Berdayev’s stress on the Middle Ages (1924) to Huizinga highlighting
Humanism (1934). If the concept of European civilisation was prevalent it did not receive a
universally shared definition. Romains’ attempt could be seen as providing an overarching
definition but it has to be described as an inoperable myth. By defining European civilisation
as the child of two minds, he created a catch-all concept able to encompass any aspect of
European history and to subsume any differing interpretations, with Apollo embracing all the
spiritual, political and intellectual developments and Prometheus the economic, technical and
material ones. However, this definition was too vague to be operable: to say that Europe
existed because it was fuelled by two European minds did not explain what made them
European, why they were specifically European or why all Europeans should have been
infused with them in the first place. In addition, this vision brushed aside many differences
amongst Europeans. Religion, for example, might have been pushed into the private sphere in
France but that was not necessarily the case for every European country. To say that all
Europeans experienced the same evolution was an extremely sweeping statement and
Romains did not prove his point. His two minds acted as a unifying factor for the concept of
European civilisation but were impossible to prove and could have easily been replaced by
‘Gods’ or any other special attributes. That is why it can be argued that Romains participated
in what Delanty (2005) called the myth-building of European identity, i.e. the creation of an
imaginary community (Costoriadis 1975), based on unverifiable tenets and an elusive
content.
This elusiveness of European civilisation was compensated by the use of the colonised Other
to confirm the existence of a European self, through the creation of a firm boundary between
an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, insiders and outsiders (Bauman 1990). By following a well-established
tradition of identifying Europe as the superior civilisation, which can be traced back to the
Encyclopaedists in the XVIIIth century (Pagden 2002, 117) down to the French Republic
12
justifying colonisation (Wieviorka 2005), Romains reinforced the sameness of the European
self. It can be argued that Romains’ Europe had a solid base only through the use of the
‘barbarian’ Other who, as so often in the construction of European identity (Delanty 1995;
Hall 1992), acted as glue for an identity difficult to pinpoint internally.
Overall, Romains’ vision was extremely coherent from a Unanimist point of view. Europe
was an entity very distinct from other groups, with its own specific mind. However, its inner
identity unravelled upon close scrutiny and Europe was left only negatively defined as
opposed to a barbarian Other. Nevertheless, his vision is of great interest historically, for the
light it casts on how Europe was commonly defined as the superior civilisation and how
colonialism was commonly endorsed and from an ideological point of view, by highlighting
the difficulty of the very concept of Europe and European identity, when looked at closely. It
is only necessary to look at the debates sparked by Turkey’s desire to join the EU to see that
where and what Europe is still lack definition today. With vastly different definitions of
Europe elicited from these debates, from being a Christian club to embracing any country
expressing the wish to be part of it, from being contained within a very strict geographical
area to encompassing any country with a European heritage (Tekin 2008), Europe still
remains deeply elusive today.
The unification of Europe
After defining the unity of Europe, Romains went further with a call for its unification,
explaining why and how that should be achieved. His first justification was common to every
reflection on Europe at the time (Spiering and Wintle 2002), in the aftermath of World War I,
peace: ‘une nouvelle guerre serait un désastre total. […] Elle marquerait pratiquement la fin
du monde occidental’ (Romains 1934, 48). This is accompanied by the idea of a special role
13
for Europe, which was to lead the world towards unification. This is the ultimate circle of
Unanimism, the creation of a universal Republic : ‘O mon rêve entre tous / O République
universelle […] / ce que je veux avoir, sans à peu près, sans tricherie / c’est le rassemblement
enfin de l’univers terrestre / une catholicité vraiment tendue et totale’ (1938, 108). This
rested heavily on a colonialist vision: Europe already dominated the rest of the world, either
directly or indirectly through its ‘sons’ in the New World, therefore the last hurdle before a
universal Republic was for Europe to unify:
Si l’Europe eût trouvé le secret de s’unir […] ce qu’elle eût adressé aux autres peuples de la terre c’eût
été non un ultimatum mais une invitation, au besoin quelque peu pressante, d’entrer dans un pacte
universel, celui que la paix de Versailles avait tâché d’instituer, mais qui restait un avorton paralytique
tant que l’Europe n’était pas unie. (Romains 1946, 289)
This casts Romains amongst the universalist trend of European thinkers, such as H.G Wells
or Harold Laski (Spiering & Wintle 2002, 41-42). However, Romains viewed pure
internationalism as ‘une formule abstraite qui ne se définit qu’en s’opposant aux
nationalismes’ (Romains 1933a, 57) and saw Europeanism as ‘l’affirmation la plus réaliste
qui soit’ (57), thus anchoring internationalism on a solid basis first.
This universalist vision led, however, to unanswered questions, in particular how this
Republic would be achieved. The League of Nations could have been seen as a way forward,
as illustrated by Dahriman (1929) or De Jouvenel (1932), but Romains displayed scepticism.
He did not oppose the League but he did not believe it was an effective forum to preserve
peace, let alone to usher in a universal Republic. He criticised in particular its lack of
instruments to address problems, such as an army, and its lack of legitimacy due to its
bureaucratic and diplomatic nature, which led nations to think about their own interests only
(Romains 1933b, 90-92). The unification of Europe was presented as a way to surpass these
problems but it begs the question as to why the non-colonised countries would have wished
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to be part of it. His vision was so grounded on the implicit idea of European supremacy that
such considerations were never discussed. At a time when many intellectuals were deploring
the decline of western civilisation (Demangeon 1920; Spengler 1926; Valéry 1919), it is
remarkable to see how Romains simply seemed to assume that the mere fact of achieving
unification in Europe would naturally lead to a Universal Republic and therefore failed to
elaborate on the process. That explains, however, why he focused so much on how to unite
Europe.
How to unite Europe
At the heart of his reflection lay the idea that Europe was poisoned by its history, which
prevented its peoples from realising they were Europeans. European identity had been buried
under the construction of national identities, based on the rejection of the other nations:
Chaque européen qui vient au monde est neuf par sa chair mais il est vieux parce qu'il hérite à sa
naissance de procès séculaires, qui n'ont jamais été vidés, qui ne le seront jamais parce qu'il est voué,
sans discussion, à l'accomplissement de vieilles vengeances (Romains 1933a, 26).
The aggressive nation-building process prevented Europeans from realising that they were
part of the same civilisation and fostered instead the creation of hereditary enemies, ready to
jump into a new war: ‘L’Europe de 1915 est en proie aux fantômes. De très vieux songes se
sont emparés d’elle et l’ont dressée dans un délire de somnambules, des songes dont plusieurs
remontent du fond des siècles’ (Romains 1933a, 24). To this analysis, shared by many others
such as Coudenhove-Kallergi (1923) or Simmel (Spiering and Wintle 2002, 30), Romains
added the social conflicts born out of the industrial revolution, leading to hopes for a social
revolution and reaction against it. These internal conflicts further removed any consciousness
of European unity (Romains 1946, 272). Romains, therefore, posited that external and
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internal conflicts acted as some kind of screen, blinding Europeans from their intrinsic unity.
To achieve unification, these ancestral fears would have to be surpassed through a European
socialisation programme, which he first presented as early as 1916.
Europe would only be united when its various peoples actually wanted to be European: ‘Le
point capital, c’est que le plus grand nombre d’hommes possible, dans chaque Etat de
l’Europe, prennent conscience et affirment que leur premier besoin, leur première
revendication se nomme l’unité européenne’ (Romains 1933a, 56). What Romains described
was similar to Renan’s subjective idea of a nation, in other words the building of a collective
identity. This is a contradiction, since his definition of Europe was based on Fichtean
objective theory. It could be argued, however, that his view was an example of how the two
could be merged: Europe will exist if people want it to be (subjective). They will want to if
they are shown to share the same characteristics (objective). The creation of individual
nations veiled Europe’s fundamental unity, which therefore had to be made explicit to all
Europeans, hence Romains’ emphasis on how to foster this common consciousness.
First, he believed that the war itself could be a catalyst to make Europeans realise how absurd
internecine conflict was, forging a way forward for Europe (1933a, 19-20). If that failed, the
millions of victims would act as a reminder and the deep traces left by the war had to be used
as a message for peace and unification (Romains 1925). However, this was not enough,
because war could easily lead to hatred and revenge and because peace would not naturally
lead to the unification of Europe if nationalism held Europeans back. Hence the necessity for
a robust socialisation programme, led by men of ‘good will’, who would be responsible for
propagating the European message, in order to get Europe used to being one (Romains 1933a,
57).
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He suggested creating a European party whose sole programme would be European unity and
whose role would be to spread the European message and create in all Europeans an
obsession for Europe (57). Its members would defend the European point of view on all
issues, in all countries, via all possible means (57). This party would not have any specific
programme except Europe itself and would have four pre-requisites: a European central bank,
a customs union, a postal union, and a monetary Union (56). Romains did not believe in a
detailed programme but in general directions (56), because once Europeans became aware of
themselves, the ways to implement their unity would automatically appear (56). The
existence of a European party did not mean that traditional parties were rejected but Romains
believed that because Europe was only one point in their programme at best they would not
be as efficient as a party dedicated to Europe (54-55). Similarly, he did not believe in
diplomacy because diplomats remained prisoners of nationalistic, or at least national, points
of views (54).
The European party would be supported by various other awareness-raising methods. The
poet’s role was to sing Europe and keep the idea burning (Romains 1916, 40). The
intellectual had to convince and argue (Romains 1935b, 28). Teachers, the hussars of the
French Republic (Ozouf & Ozouf 1992) became hussars of Europe, to transform a national
consciousness into a European one and promote the Universal Republic (Romains1938, 138).
Finally, Romains called on anybody, at any level to spread the message, for example by
supporting politicians who promoted Europe (1934, 125).
Several observations can be made about Romains’ socialisation program. First, it is deeply
influenced by his Unanimist philosophy which stresses the need for a group to become aware
of itself (Cuisenier 1969, 20) through creative individuals, who ignite a spark, and is based on
the idea that individuals are able to act on the world and transform it (Romains 1934, VII).
Second, he can be seen as a precursor of what many inter-war organisations put forward in
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the Twenties, from the Movement for a European customs union to Pan-Europa who stressed
how vital it was to rally public opinion around European ideas (Kallergi 1923) or Julien
Benda (1933) who wanted to fix Europe in Europeans’ hearts and minds. It has to be
highlighted that this programme written during the war for an American newspaper was not
published then because it was deemed too pacifist (Rony 1993, 235). It was only published in
1930, thus limiting any direct influence it could have had on the immediate post World War I
thinking. However, from a genealogical point of view, Romains’ programme has to be seen
as one of the earliest fully-fledged European socialisation plan.
Indeed, it was designed to foster a new loyalty amongst Europeans and to operate what many
researchers feel is needed to spawn a new identity, that is to create changes in ‘the abstract,
psychological and symbolic links in which the production and reproduction of loyalties and
sentiments occurs’(Paasi 2001, 9) in order to elevate national identities to a higher level
(Hassner 1997; Linklater 1997). Romains gave a very good illustration of this process,
implementing the same tools used by countries to create their own identities (Paasi 2001),
including education, the media, legitimising discourses, political organisations, and a constant
reminder of being part of a nation. The only one he refused was violence, so widely used in
the creation of national identity, both real and symbolic (Llobera 2003; Shore 1993). It can be
argued that a vision based on good will and non-violent persuasion was ill adapted to the
deeply entrenched nationalism of his time (Chabot 2005, 292-302) and it may appear
unrealistic in retrospect. However, this very developed socialisation programme needs to be
added to the abundant proposals made during the interwar period (as discussed in Chabot
2005; Du Réau, 2008; Spiering and Wintle 2002), which paved the way for the route taken
after the Second World War. Numerous similarities can be found, from Romains’ idea that
Europeans must get used to working together, echoed in Robert Schuman’s speech when
launching the European Community of Coal and Steel (1950), to the necessity to defend a
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European point of view everywhere, reprised in Monnet’s statement that national issues must
be transformed into common European issues (Duroselle 1974, 12), or the emphasis put, right
from the start of the European project, on education (Petit 2006, 664-678), which is
reminiscent of the role Romains ascribed to teachers. This does not mean that a direct link
from Romains to the fathers of the European construction can be established but it does mean
that he is of great interest for the genealogy of actions implemented after the Second World
War.
The third observation is that the integrationist scope of his programme was breath-taking, as a
monetary union would have automatically led to substantial loss of sovereignty. However, as
Romains claimed that, once united, Europe would find a way to organise itself, no details
about its future organisation were outlined, which left aside how national sovereignties would
be managed. Romains advocated the ‘sublimation’ of national feeling as opposed to its
suppression: ‘C’est en ce sens qu’il m’apparaît nécessaire pour les états nationaux de
procéder au plus vite à ce que j’appellerai une sublimation de l’idée nationale. Je ne dis pas
suppression mais sublimation’ (1935a, 187). However, this concept was not explained and
did not tackle the issue of national sovereignty, which proved so crucial in this period.
Indeed, the extreme care Briand took in his Memorandum to reassure his counterparts that
their sovereignty would not be affected by his proposals (Heater 1992, 135), which still failed
to convince European states ( Heater 1992, 143), illustrates the strength of national
sovereignty in the interwar period (Chabot 2005, 292-298). Romains’ Unanimist vision of a
group of individuals, in this case Europeans, becoming aware of themselves and organising
themselves, thus naturally breaking down national barriers, was coherent. However, by
aiming to foster a desire for Europe without explaining what it was going to be like Romains
ignored the power of national sovereignties and made mass mobilisation for a vague future
difficult.
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All in all, Romains offered a fully-fledged programme to unify Europe but his Unanimist
belief in the power of self-awareness led him to leave aside the organisational aspect of any
future United Europe, thus limiting its potential mobilising impact and making it appear
unrealistic in retrospect. The socialisation programme outlined by Romains was meant to
create a desire for Europe and unity. However, it would fail until what Romains considered
the main obstacle to European unity, namely the Franco-German feud, was not resolved.
Franco-German reconciliation
Romains presented France and Germany as the spearhead of European unification. It is ‘la
pierre angulaire de la paix européenne, ou l’axe des futurs Etats-unis d’Europe’ (1933b, 89).
This Franco-German bias was based on the idea that, as all political crisis in Europe had
involved them both, harmony was impossible if the Franco-German issue was not solved
(1933b, 65).
This stress on Germany is typical of interwar France, where the German question was
paramount (Bariety 1987; Valentin 1991). A whole spectrum of policies was found at that
time, ranging from revenge to cooperation, via containment and appeasement, as illustrated
by the decision to occupy the Ruhr in 1923 to Briand and Stresemann’s cooperation to
appeasement policies in the Thirties (Bernstein 2011). Romains argued for reconciliation as
early as 1916 (1933a, 58) and repeatedly called for a policy based on genuine dialogue, to put
an end to the conflicts between the two countries. For true reconciliation, hostility towards
Germany had to cease and be replaced by dialogue. This is why he criticised interwar French
policies, in particular containment in the Twenties and early Thirties, as such attitudes would
only increase Germany’s distrust. Any policy other than dialogue was presented as likely to
lead to another war (1934, 122).
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The reconciliation policy had to continue even with Hitler because he might be ‘le fou de la
maison’ (Romains 1946, 288) he was still European, therefore dialogue remained possible.
Romains did not think that Europe could be united with Nazi Germany because any union
had to be based on democracy (Romains 1936, 1) but he believed that dialogue to avoid a
new war was possible, and that led him to criticise Hitler’s opponents and victims, such as the
Jews or the Socialists, for sabotaging any chance of dialogue and peace, by spreading a
negative image of Germany. He stated that it was better to talk to Hitler and save Europe,
rather than condemning his actions in the name of ideals and contributing to a new war. Thus,
whilst stating that he understood how nauseating Hitler’s anti-Semitic policy was, he argued
that ‘il faut que les passions les plus légitimes sachent se taire quand les intérêt qui les
dépassent sont en jeu’ (1934, 78) and even though France should defend refugees from
Germany, their hostility to the Nazi regime was harmful, because they jeopardised the
development of true dialogue.
Romains’ attitude has to be linked to his deeply entrenched pacifism, the same pacifism that
led him to oppose World War I (“Je trouve absurde de mourir pour une cause à laquelle on ne
croit pas” (1933d)). Preserving peace was preserving Europe, permitting possible unification
at a later stage, once dictatorships had disappeared. War was a bigger evil than Nazism, hence
his anger at those who wanted firm actions against Hitler:
Qu’ils osent regarder leur propre pensée en face! Ont-ils envie de déclarer une ‘nouvelle guerre du
droit et de la liberté’? Si même ils ne prennent pas sur eux de la déclencher, se feront-ils les complices
des forces qui la déclencheraient? (1934, 76)
He was not unique in this attitude. Horne (2009) analysed how France underwent a
demobilisation of its wartime culture in the Twenties, replacing it with a rejection of war
itself and Prost highlighted how “the whole of France was pacifist and this pacifism was the
reason France did not oppose Hitler earlier” (1994, 210). Romains’ statements about refugees
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echoed the Ligue internationale des combattants pour la paix who were alarmed by the anti-
German and pro-war propaganda they were spreading (Ingram 2004, 323). Romains can
therefore be seen as a good example of the pacifism and what has been called the “war
anxiety” (Hucker 2007) of large sections of the French population and politicians at the time,
spawned by the horrors of the First World War. Peace was more important than defeating
fascism (Vaisse and Adamthwaite 1993) and any action designed to prevent war was to be
applauded. His integral pacifism, however, was replaced by a combative version when it
became clear to him, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, that his calls for dialogue
had failed and he advocated that democracies should stand firm and refuse false dialogue
(1960, 26-27).
Romains’ focus on France and Germany as the bedrock for any future European unification
was fully coherent with his socialisation process of breaking down the historical barriers
between Europeans. His call for dialogue, until this policy was proved unfeasible, was also
coherent with his belief in the capacity of good will to overcome any obstacles. This Franco-
German bias, however, begs the question as to why other European countries would have
necessarily followed suit if France and Germany had succeeded in their reconciliation. In
addition, his reliance on good will and dialogue failed to cope with aggressive nationalism.
Added to the limits in his socialisation programme already outlined this casts his programme
as very coherent from an Unanimist point of view of awareness-raising actions but utopian in
its inability to deal with the importance of nationalism, from the mild version of defending
national sovereignties to the extreme form of bellicose behaviour. However, historically, it is
an illuminating example of the German issue in interwar France and from a genealogical
point of view, it provides a very developed example of actions that would be implemented
after the Second World War.
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Conclusion
Romains can be called a ‘total’ European: he eulogised Europe’s beauty, fought for its unity,
provided a rationale for its existence and a programme to achieve it. His ideas may lack
conceptual robustness and unravel upon close analysis but they are nevertheless of great
interest for analysts of the history of European integration. His ideas might not have been
implemented at the time but they are an example of the seeds that would be reaped after the
Second World War.
Culturally and historically, they illustrate various aspects of the France of his time, an era
marked by psychology of the peoples, ethnocentrism, colonialism and an obsession with
Germany. Politically and ideologically, his ideas represent a very good insight into the
interwar European debate: the internationalist trend, non-violent measures to raise awareness,
emphasis on education, attempts to find a European civilisation and define it, creation of a
European ‘us’ versus a colonised ‘them’, craving for peace, and craving for Europe to find a
role in the world. His ideas also give some clues as to why this groundswell in favour of
Europe ultimately failed: the vagueness of the programme, the inability to grasp the depth of
both nationalism and national sovereignty leading to an inability to implement the
socialisation programmes put forward, as well as the ambiguities as to what Europe was and
what it should be.
Ultimately, Romains illustrates the difficulties of the very concept of Europe. The vagueness
of his European geography, his incomplete programme once Europe was united, the
conceptual difficulties of his concept of ‘European civilisation’ all echo the current problems
of defining Europe. Many attempts have been made to define Europe, give it borders or prove
that it has an identity and content. They have varied over the years (Delanty 1995), the
borders have been drawn and redrawn (Tunander et al. 1997), the aims of European unity
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have varied (Paasi 2001, 9), the idea of the very existence of a European identity has been
challenged (Delanty 1995; Shore 1993) and the ideal organisation of Europe is still very
much unclear (Llobera 2003). Romains epitomises the mercurial nature of the concept of
Europe, an idea that has been invented and reinvented throughout the ages and which remains
elusive today.
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